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Lame-Duck Bankruptcy Institutions 
under Government Intervention in 
Reorganisation of Listed 
Companies in China
❒
Zhao Huimi ao*
Government intervention in the bankruptcy reorganisation of listed companies 
in China constitutes a major obstacle to implement the Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law of the People’s Republic of China which was enacted in 2006 (2006 EBL).1 
The 2006 EBL improves upon its predecessor legislation—the 1986 EBL, 
which granted extensive powers to the Chinese government for its administrative 
control over the bankruptcy of enterprises, mainly state-owned enterprises. 
A new administrator mechanism has been established to replace the old 
liquidation group; the power of the creditors’ meeting has been strengthened and 
the creditors’ committee has been established in the 2006 EBL to better protect 
the interests of the creditors, which was intentionally ignored under the 1986 
EBL; the people’s court obtained more powers in confirming the reorganisation 
plans by using its cramdown power and controlling the bankruptcy proceedings 
under the 2006 EBL. One of the goals of the lawmakers to improve these 
bankruptcy institutions is to reduce the government intervention in China and 
protect the interests of stakeholders. However, government intervention in fact 
renders these bankruptcy institutions weak and cannot function as expected by 
the lawmakers. This article analyses the negative effects exerted on the these 
institutions by the government intervention in the bankruptcy reorganisation 
of listed companies in China and argues that the government should return the 
powers to the bankruptcy institutions in order to let the bankruptcy system serve 
a better function in China’s market.
* PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. The author thanks Professor Zhang 
Xianchu and Dr Emily Lee for their illuminating comments and suggestions. The author also 
thanks the anonymous reviewers appointed by the HKLJ for their constructive comments and 
the editorial staff for their outstanding editing. All errors remain mine.
1 The English version of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388019.htm (visited 
3 February 2016). The new EBL was passed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 27 August 2006 and came into effect on 1 June 2007.
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1. Introduction
This article examines the negative impacts exerted by government 
intervention on bankruptcy institutions, namely the creditors’ meeting 
and committee, the bankruptcy administrator and the people’s 
court. The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) has established 
the creditors’ committee,2 which did not exist in the 1986 EBL, to 
supervise the management and disposal of the bankruptcy estate when 
creditors’ meetings are not in session, and to supervise the distribution 
of the bankruptcy estate and other duties as entrusted by the creditors’ 
meeting.3 The powers of creditors’ meeting have been expanded.4 The 
2006 EBL attempts to provide creditors with more autonomy to protect 
their interests by strengthening the creditors’ meeting and establishing 
the creditors’ committee. Moreover, a new bankruptcy administrator 
system is established to fairly protect the interests of all stakeholders. The 
bankruptcy administrator could be assumed by social intermediaries, such 
as law, accountancy and liquidation firms, and professional individuals 
affiliated with social intermediaries.5 The power of the people’s court 
is also strengthened. The 2006 EBL entrusts the people’s court with 
the power to cramdown reorganisation plans rejected by creditors 
under certain conditions.6 All these measures aim to pave the way for 
bankruptcy institutions to play a more fundamental role in the bankruptcy 
of enterprises and reduce the meddling of the government in enterprise 
bankruptcy. However, these bankruptcy institutions do not work well 
because the government still plays a strong role in the reorganisation of 
listed companies in practice.
This article comprises six sections. Section 2 explores the 
problems with the obstinate liquidation group.7 The liquidation-group 
administrator dominates the reorganisation of listed companies in 
practice. In this section, negative impacts of the government-official-
dominated liquidation group on the new administrator mechanism are 
examined. The liquidation groups are more partial towards the rights of 
2 S 2 of Ch VII of the 2006 EBL.
3 Art 67 of the 2006 EBL.
4 Art 61 of the 2006 EBL.
5 Art 24 of the 2006 EBL.
6 Art 87 of the 2006 EBL.
7 The liquidation group can perform their duties in liquidation, conciliation and reorganisation 
proceedings. Its functions are not confined to liquidation although it may lead to such 
misunderstandings due to the wording of its name liquidation group. It is an organisation 
inherited from the 1986 EBL and its main function is to liquidate the SOEs. This is the 
reason why it was named liquidation group as no reorganisation system existed under the 
1986 EBL. Although the reorganisation system was established under the 2006 EBL, the name 
of the liquidation group remained the same and it was granted the rights to administer the 
reorganisation process of enterprises.
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shareholders. The protection of shareholders’ interests is achieved at the 
costs of general creditors. Creditors are actually placed in a less powerful 
position than the shareholders in the reorganisation of listed companies. 
Impediments towards an independent and impartial administrator system 
are also discussed.
Section 3 focuses on the problems of the creditors’ meeting and 
committee. These two institutions have very limited power in practice. 
First, the rights and duties of these two institutions and their power over 
the replacement and supervision of the administrator under the 2006 
EBL are reviewed. The power of these two institutions to supervise and 
control the administrator—the liquidation group in particular, is far 
from adequate. Furthermore, the attitude of the people’s court and the 
liquidation-group administrator towards the protection of the creditors’ 
rights is also problematic as they encroach the rights and interests of the 
creditors.
In Section 4, the subordinate role of the people’s court to the 
government in the reorganisation process of listed companies in China 
is discussed. The people’s court cannot independently make decisions 
on whether they can accept or reject the reorganisation applications 
of listed companies in practice. Prior approval from the government is 
a prerequisite. Furthermore, the people’s court cannot independently 
confirm the reorganisation plans of listed companies. Section 5 discusses 
the effects of the reorganisation of listed companies under government 
intervention. Section 6 concludes this article.
2. Lack of a Well-Functioning Administrator Mechanism
Strong and efficient bankruptcy institutions are vital to the smooth 
implementation of the bankruptcy system in China. The World Bank, the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development all 
emphasise the importance of institutional frameworks by recommending 
that member states improve the institutional capacity to better 
implement their bankruptcy laws.8 The 2006 EBL has put into place a 
new administrator system that replaced the old liquidation group that 
consisted exclusively of government officials from various departments 
8 See more in the World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/5807554-1357753926066/
ICR Principles-Jan2011[FINAL].pdf (visited 12 November 2014) pp 6–9, 23–24 and Terence 
C Halliday, “Lawmaking and Institutional Building in Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between 
Global Norms and National Circumstances” in OECD, Asian Insolvency Systems: Closing the 
Implementation Gap (2007) pp 22–42.
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under the 1986 EBL. However, there are still many problems with this 
newly established administrator system.
(a)  Dominance of Liquidation Group in Reorganisation of Listed 
Companies
The most conspicuous problem about the liquidation group is its lack 
of impartiality and independence. The administrator should be impartial 
in the bankruptcy process. There are many interests involved in the 
reorganisation process of listed companies including, inter alia, the 
interests of the debtor, the creditors, employees, holders of the recall right 
and of the exemption right, the government and the community. The 
variety of interests involved in the reorganisation process entails that the 
administrator should be impartial, not simply representing one or two 
specific parties. The UNCITRAL points out that:
“[h]owever appointed, the insolvency representative plays a central role 
in the effective and efficient implementation of an insolvency law, with 
certain powers over debtors and their assets … and to ensure that the law 
is applied effectively and impartially” .9
To ensure that the administrator is impartial, the administrator should be 
able to demonstrate that it is independent of the vested interests, whether 
these are economic, familial or other in nature, as such connections would 
probably prejudice the interests of stakeholders in the bankruptcy process. 
Disclosure of conflict of interests by the administrator could reduce such 
possibility of prejudice. The impartiality or lack of independence can 
be assessed against the circumstance disclosed.10 In addition, the legal 
source of the administrator’s competence also requires its impartiality. 
Its competence is derived from the 2006 EBL,11 not from the people’s 
court or the agent of creditors or the debtor. The administrator is only 
responsible to the people’s court, which has the legal right to designate 
the administrator pursuant to the 2006 EBL, not any of the stakeholders.12
Impartiality is the fundamental requirement for the administrator 
to perform its duties in the reorganisation process .13 However, the 
9 UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (New York, United Nations: UNCITRAL, 
2004) p 174.
10 Ibid., p 176.
11 Art 22 of the 2006 EBL.
12 Art 23 of the 2006 EBL.
13 奚晓明/Xiaoming Xi (ed), 最高人民法院: 关于企业破产法司法解释理解与适用—破产
管理人制度· 新旧破产法衔接 [The SPC: On the Understanding and Application of the Judicial 
Interpretations of the 2006 EBL—Administrator System and the Connection between the Old and 
New EBL] (北京: 人民法院出版社/Beijing: the People’s Court Press, 2007) p 70.
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administrator is not impartial in most reorganisation cases of listed 
companies. The liquidation-group administrator does not aim at protecting 
the interests of all stakeholders; it is more like the representative of local 
governments. The findings of a case study made by the author on the 
designation of different types of administrators and the interests that are 
protected by the liquidation-group administrator support this argument 
(for more details, please refer to Appendix A).
To begin with, listed companies with state investment favour the 
liquidation-group type administrator rather than the social-intermediary 
administrator. Figure 1 shows that 28 out of 29 (96.6%) listed State-
owned Enterprises (SOEs)14 designated the liquidation group as the 
administrator. Among the 28 listed SOEs, 24 are companies with the 
state as a controlling shareholder and four are companies with the state 
14 SOEs in a broad sense includes three kinds of enterprises with state investment:
(1)  pure SOEs, referring to enterprises whose capitals are all owned by the state;
(2)  enterprises controlled by the state, including absolute control (state equity >50%) and 
relative control (state equity <50% but have controlling power over the company); and
(3) enterprises with the state being a small shareholder.
 SOEs in this article include enterprises which fall into types (2) and (3), and are called 
enterprises with state investment or SOEs for convenience. For the concept of SOEs, please 
refer to “国家统计局关于对国有公司企业认定意见的函 [Letter of the National Bureau 
of Statistics on the Opinion of Identifying the State-Owned Companies]”, available at 
http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/blank/claw!fetch.action?id=g000033027 (visited 26 June 2015).
Figure 1: Designation of the Liquidation Group as Administrator 
among Different Types of Listed Companies
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28 
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Source: The data is collected by the author from the website of http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.
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as a small shareholder (see Figure 2).15 In comparison, seven private 
listed companies out of 16 (43.8%) designated the liquidation group as 
the administrator. As a result, 92% of the liquidation group, which are 
headed by government officials, dominates the reorganisation of listed 
companies in China.16
Second, the liquidation group is inclined to protect the interests of 
state shareholders at the expense of general creditors. Insolvency cases 
require funds both to reorganise debtors and to cover the resettlement 
and other claims of workers. Local governments are not willing to foot 
the bill. The liquidation group, which represents the local governments, 
realises the goals of the government to safeguard state-owned assets in 
the listed companies, protects the interests of the local government, such 
as in terms of local taxes, gross domestic product, employment or other 
political interests like the administrative achievement of local officials and 
social stability in intervening in the reorganisation of listed companies. 
This is the reason why listed SOEs prefer the liquidation group to social 
intermediary in their reorganisation.
Among the 45 listed companies, 36 designate the liquidation group 
as administrator (see Appendix A). Figure 3 shows that the shareholder 
equity in seven of the cases among the 36 has not been reduced, while 
the equity has been reduced in all nine cases with a social intermediary 
as the administrator.
The liquidation group tends to file an application to the people’s court 
to cramdown reorganisation plans rejected by a group/s of creditors (and 
15 In this article, both types of listed companies with the State being a controlling shareholder or 
a small shareholder are regarded as SOEs in a general sense. Please refer to “国家统计局关于
对国有公司企业认定意见的函 [Letter of the National Bureau of Statistics on the Opinion 
of Identifying the State-Owned Companies]”, available at http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/blank/
claw!fetch.action?id=g000033027 (visited 1 August 2015).
16 See Appendix A for more detail.
Figure 2: Types of SOEs that Designated Liquidation Group as 
Administrator
24 
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LCs with the state being
the controlling shareholder   
LCs with the state being
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Source: The data is collected by the author from the website of http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.
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shareholders in some cases). Figure 4 shows that the reorganisation plans 
are crammed down by the people’s court in 11 out of the 36 (30.6%) listed 
companies with the liquidation group as the administrator.17 By contrast, 
17 The 11 listed companies are S*ST Tianfa, S*ST Guangming, *ST Jinhua, *ST Xinye, *ST Baoshuo, 
*ST Canghua, S*ST Tianyi, *ST Guangxia, *ST Dixian B, *ST Fangxiang and *ST Jincheng.
Figure 3: Comparison of Reduction of Shareholder Equity in Cases 
with  Liquidation Group and Social Intermediary as Administrator 
Respectively
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Source: The data is collected by the author. For more information, please see Appendix A: 
General  Information of Reorganisation of 45 Listed Companies.
Figure 4: Comparison of Reorganisation Plans Confirmed 
by  Cramdown Procedure with Liquidation Group and Social 
 Intermediary as the Administrator Respectively
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General Information of Reorganisation of 45 Listed Companies.
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the reorganisation plans are crammed down in one out of the nine (11.1%) 
listed companies with a social intermediary as the administrator,18 a much 
smaller proportion.
Figure 5 shows that 8 out of 29 (27.6%) listed SOEs19 were under 
the cramdown provision and this is true for 420 out of the 16 (25%) 
private companies, which is a very small difference. This indicates that 
it is not the ownership that leads to the different treatments between 
the shareholders and creditors, but the liquidation group itself. The 
liquidation group firmly controls the reorganisation process of both 
SOEs and some private listed companies. Creditors, especially small 
creditors, have few opportunities to negotiate the treatment of their 
claims and the conditions of the reorganisation, although they have such 
legal rights according to the 2006 EBL. Reorganisation plans drafted by 
the liquidation-group administrator are mainly based on negotiation 
with big shareholders and new investors.21 S uch plans are pressed onto 
creditors with little notice for their voting, which results in a much lower 
repayment rate to the general creditors than to other type of creditors 
18 The case is *ST Hongsheng.
19 These eight listed companies are S*ST Tianfa, *ST Jinhua, *ST Guangxia, *ST Xinye, 
*ST Baoshuo, *ST Canghua, S*ST Tianyi and *ST Jinding.
20 The four listed companies are *ST Dixian B, *ST Fangxiang, *ST Jincheng and *ST Hongsheng.
21 中国政法大学破产法与企业重组研究中心研究组 (许美征执笔)/Research Group of the 
Bankruptcy Law and Restructuring Research Centre of China University of Political Science 
and Law (Drafted by Meizheng Xu), “我国上市公司重整管理人模式的案例研究/A Case 
Study of the Administrators of the Reorganizations of Listed Corporations in China” in 李曙
光/Shuguang Li and 郑志斌/Zhibin Zheng (eds), 公司重整法律评论/Law Review of Corporate 
Reorganization and Restructuring (北京: 法律出版社/Beijing: Law Press China, 2012) p 10.
Figure 5: Comparison of Reorganisation Plans Passed under  Cramdown 
Process for Listed Companies with/without State Investment
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Source: The data is collected by the author. For more information, please see Appendix A: 
General Information of Reorganisation of 45 Listed Companies.
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and shareholders. According to the data collected by the author, the 
average repayment rate of the listed companies without cramming down 
is 27.97%,22 w hile those with cramming down is 13.58%.23 The interests 
of the creditors could be prejudicially affected when liquidation group is 
involved in the reorganisation of listed companies.
To sum up, the impartiality of the administrator is greatly undermined 
by the partial liquidation group which mainly represents the interests 
of the government, at least in the reorganisation of listed companies. 
The liquidation group becomes the dominant form of the administrator 
designated by the people’s court. Listed companies with the state as a 
shareholder, both controlling and small, prefer the liquidation-group 
type of administrator to social intermediaries. Liquidation groups 
composed of local government officials place the administrative goals 
and interests of local governments above all and achieve them at the 
expense of general creditors. In addition, compared with the social-
intermediary administrator, the liquidation group is inclined to protect 
the interests of the controlling shareholders, such as State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Committees (SASAC) at various levels 
or local SOEs in particular, again at the expense of general creditors. 
The liquidation-group administrator is also more likely than the social-
intermediary administrator to apply for the cramdown procedure to 
approve the reorganisation plans by the people’s court.
It is not that the mere presence of government officials per se in the 
liquidation group definitely prejudices the interests of parties other than 
those of the local governments. The real problem is that the government 
officials in either pure-government-official or mixed-type liquidation 
groups still have the final decision-making power in the reorganisation 
of listed companies. Other parties cannot effectively check and balance 
their powers. This has greatly affected the effectiveness of the new 
administrator mechanism.
The second problem is the lack of independence of the administrator 
due to the unduly involvement of the government. Social intermediaries, 
such as law and accountancy firms, have independent legal status and 
assets to undertake civil responsibilities. However, liquidation groups 
which are formed by government officials from different government 
departments (pure government-official liquidation group), legal or 
accountancy professionals from law, and accountancy or liquidation 
firms (mixed-type liquidation group) have neither independent legal 
status nor assets to undertake civil responsibilities for the losses they 
22 The result is obtained from the following calculation: debt-repayment rate is set as R, number 
of listed companies as n, then the average R=(R1+ R2+ R3+ … + Rn)/n.
23 Ibid. 
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incur in the reorganisation work. Government official members of 
the liquidation group are subject to the instructions given by local 
governments. When they incur economic losses to creditors or 
debtors during the reorganisation procedure, the local government is 
not legally liable for their misdeeds. The government in fact has no 
legal obligation to deal with enterprise bankruptcy. Hence there is no 
legal ground for them to take responsibility for the misdeeds of their 
employees—the government officials in the bankruptcy process. It is 
therefore unrealistic to hold government officials personally liable for 
their misdeeds as they are designated by the people’s court.24 This was 
previously a problem with the liquidation group under the 1986 EBL 
and continues to exist even in the reorganisation of listed companies 
under the 2006 EBL. It would still be difficult for stakeholders to make 
a claim for any civil compensation from the liquidation group if their 
interests are affected.
The independence of the administrator should include the ability to 
make decisions independently,25 such as soliciting a new investor for the 
reorganised listed company, reduction of shareholder equity and alteration 
of creditor claims during the bankruptcy process of the listed companies. 
If the administrator follows the instructions of local government as a 
shareholder, its decisions on these matters will prejudice the interests 
of other parties, especially creditors as discussed above. In practice, 
the liquidation group is mainly composed of government officials. It is 
highly doubtful from the above discussion that such a composition of 
the administrator could effectively discourage the interference of the 
government and maintain independence to make fair and transparent 
decisions, which is further discussed in Section 4.
Although the institution of the administrator is introduced in the 
2006 EBL, it has been greatly localised to facilitate the government 
intervention in the reorganisation of listed companies in practice. 
This sort of liquidation group is neither impartial, nor can undertake 
civil liabilities or make independent decisions on matters such as 
soliciting eligible and suitable strategic investors for the bankrupt 
listed companies. It fails to adequately protect the interests of the 
stakeholders, especially the creditors. Hence, they should no longer be 
made the predominant type of administrator in the reorganisation of 
listed companies in China.
24 See (n 21 above), p 10.
25 See UNCITRAL (n 9 above), p 174.
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(b)  Channels for Liquidation Group to Be Designated as 
Administrator
Pursuant to Art 24 of the 2006 EBL, the role of the administrator could 
be assumed by (1) liquidation group; (2) social intermediary, such as law, 
accountancy and bankruptcy liquidation firms; or (3) qualified individual 
affiliated with social intermediaries.
The 2006 EBL generally allows for the retention of the old liquidation 
system. Now that the lawmakers intend to make the administrator more 
independent, impartial and professional, why is the much-criticised 
liquidation group preserved in the 2006 EBL? This is mainly out of the 
consideration of the connection between the old practice of the policy 
bankruptcy of SOEs, of the consistency between other laws that stipulate 
the formation of liquidation group, and of the special stipulation on 
the formation of liquidation group when dealing with the bankruptcy 
of special types of enterprises such as financial institutions and the new 
2006 EBL. The formation and designation of liquidation group should be 
exceptionally provided in the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) on Designating the Administrator during the Trial of Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Cases (Administrator Designation Provisions).26 According 
to Art 18, liquidation group could be designated as the administrator only 
in four conditions:
 (1) under relevant laws before the acceptance of the bankruptcy 
application;
 (2)  when dealing with the bankruptcy of SOEs under the policy 
bankruptcy system;27
 (3)  when relevant specific laws provide that a liquidation group 
shall be designated; or
26 SPC, “最高人民法院关于审理企业破产案件指定管理人的规定/Provisions of the SPC 
on Designating the Administrator during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases” the SPC 
(12 April 2007), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6018&CGid 
(visited 8 July 2015).
27 The policy bankruptcy scheme deals with the bankruptcy of some special SOEs chosen by local 
governments. It consists of a number of administrative policies issued by the central government. 
It has several characteristics according to Professor Xianchu Zhang:
(1) resettlement of workers is the top priority in the bankruptcy of the chosen SOEs;
(2) the policies encourage mergers and acquisitions instead of bankruptcy of the SOEs;
(3)  the central government allocates funds to help the state-owned banks write off their 
recoverable loans; and
(4)  the central government instigates annual SOE bankruptcy planning with the 
 participation of state ministries and provincial governments. See Xianchu Zhang, 
“A Critical Analysis of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law”, unpublished paper in the 
author’s possession (2012).
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 (4) other cases under which the people’s court considers proper to 
designate a liquidation group as the administrator.
Moreover, Arts 16, 17 and 18 of Administrator Designation Provisions 
clearly states that social intermediary and qualified individuals have 
general priority over the liquidation group to be designated as the 
administrator.28 Compared with the liquidation group, social intermediary 
and individual professionals are generally more independent, professional 
and impartial.
Although the liquidation group is preserved in the 2006 EBL, it is not 
intended to be the dominant form of the administrator mechanism. It 
is mostly an interim arrangement to make other laws and the 2006 EBL 
consistent and to allow more time for the administrative liquidation of 
some chosen SOEs under the regime of policy bankruptcy to facilitate 
the reform of SOEs.29 It should not be made the dominant form of the 
administrator.30
In practice, 36 among the 45 listed companies designate the liquidation 
group as the administrator. All of them actually do not correspond to 
the conditions stipulated in Art 18 of the Administrator Designation 
Provisions. The liquidation group formed under Art 18(1) literally deals 
with the liquidation, voluntary or involuntary, of companies upon their 
dissolution under Art 183 of the Company Law;31 commercial banks under 
Art 69 or termination by the government under Art 70 of the Commercial 
Bank Law;32 insurance companies under Art 89 or termination in 
accordance with Art 150 of the Insurance Law;33 financial institutions 
under the Regulations on the Cancellation of Financial Institutions;34 
28 See Arts 16 and 17 of the Administrator Designation Provisions.
29 See Xiaoming Xi (ed) (n 13 above), p 74.
30 Ibid., p 69.
31 See Art 183 of the Company Law:
“Where any company is dissolved according to the provisions of Article 180(1), (2), 
(4), or (5) of this Law, a liquidation group shall be formed within 15 days after the 
occurrence of the cause of dissolution so as to carry out a liquidation. The liquidation 
group of a limited liability company shall be composed of the shareholders, while that of 
a joint stock limited company shall be composed of the directors or any other people as 
determined by the shareholders’ assembly. Where no liquidation group is formed within 
the time limit, the creditors may plead the people’s court to designate relevant persons 
to form a liquidation group. The people’s court shall accept such request and form a 
liquidation group so as to carry out the liquidation in a timely manner”.
32 Commercial Bank Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was passed by the Standing 
Committee of the People’s National Congress (NPCSC) on 10 May 1995 and amended on 
27 December 2003.
33 The Insurance Law of the PRC was passed by the NPCSC on 30 June 1995 and amended on 
28 October 2002 and 28 February 2009, respectively.
34 金融机构撤销条例/Regulations on the Cancellation of Financial Institutions, issued by the 
State Council on 23 November 2001.
HKLJ-46(1)-07.Lame-Duck Bankruptcy Institutions-Zhao Huimiao.indd   12 01/04/16   16:49
Vol 46 Part 1 Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Listed Companies in China 13
and trust and investment companies or financial leasing companies under 
related regulations.35 After examining all 36 listed companies, it is evident 
that they would neither be liquidated under the Company Law, nor would 
they comprise one of the specific types of companies listed above. Hence, 
Art 18(1) does not support the designation of a liquidation group as the 
administrator in the reorganisation of these companies. Article 18(2) 
deals with the designation of a liquidation group as the administrator in 
bankruptcy of SOEs under policy bankruptcy. However, none of these 
listed companies qualify under the terms of policy bankruptcy as it mainly 
deals with SOEs which are small and face the difficulties to reform. Art 
18(3) coheres to the 2006 EBL and the laws passed and implemented 
before its promulgation.36 These laws stipulate that a liquidation 
group should be organised upon the bankruptcy of special enterprises, 
mainly financial institutions, such as commercial banks and insurance 
companies as mentioned above. However, this article does not constitute 
the grounds for designating a liquidation group as the administrator in the 
reorganisation of these companies.
How then, does the liquidation group manage to dominate the 
reorganisation of listed companies after the promulgation of the 2006 EBL 
in China? There are generally two ways. The first is an informal summary 
(the Summary) of a conference jointly held by the Second Tribunal of 
the SPC, and the Legal Division and Initial Public Offering Division of 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in Kunshan, Jiangsu 
Province in December 2007. At this conference, a conclusion that 
the Administrator Designation Provisions were not applicable to the 
designation of the administrator in the reorganisation of listed companies 
was jointly made. According to the Summary, social intermediaries are 
not capable of reorganising listed companies due to their limited expertise 
and coordinating ability to address the highly complicated process of 
the reorganisation of listed companies.37 The liquidation groups would 
instead, be the best option in this situation, and are to be designated 
as the administrator based on the current national situation of China 
pursuant to this Summary.38
If there is any legitimacy of this Summary, it may find its legal basis in 
Art 18(4) of the Administrator Designation Provisions: the people’s court 
35 信托公司管理办法/Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies, issued by the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on 23 January 2007; 金融租赁公司管理办法/Measures for 
the Administration of Financial Leasing Companies, issued by China Banking Regulatory 
Commission on 13 March 2014.
36 See Xiaoming Xi (ed) (n 13 above), p 76.
37 See (n 21 above), p 3.
38 Ibid.
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could designate a liquidation group as the administrator in enterprise 
bankruptcy if it deems it to be fair. Yet it is still debatable whether 
Art 18(4) is suitable to be the legal basis of designating liquidation group 
as the administrator in the reorganisation of listed companies, as this 
article itself is neither clear nor certain. To begin with, it is unclear as to 
which level of the people’s court, that is, whether the SPC or the people’s 
court hearing the bankruptcy case, has the right to make the decision on 
whether designating a liquidation group as the administrator is considered 
to be fair and on what specific conditions for doing so. It is also ambiguous 
as to whether the SPC should issue a general interpretation to solve this 
problem or allow the people’s court to make such decisions on a case-by-
case basis. Furthermore, the effect of this Summary is uncertain. Although 
the liquidation group should be designated as the administrator in the 
reorganisation of listed companies in China following the Summary, 
some cases designate a social intermediary as the administrator, such as 
*ST Chaori39 and *ST Chuangzhi.40 As an informal conference summary, it 
should have no binding force on the people’s court. However, it does bring 
about uncertainty to the application of the Administrator Designation 
Provisions in designating the administrator in the reorganisation of listed 
companies.41
The second method is some innovative actions taken by local 
governments. It has become a common practice for municipal 
governments or even provincial governments to establish interim groups 
which they call working groups,42 special working groups,43 groups that 
protect the stock-listing status of X Company44 or liquidation group even 
before the listed companies entered into reorganisation. The interim 
working groups conduct the work that fall within the competence of 
the administrator, such as negotiating with bank creditors and potential 
investors.45 Local governments establish these quasi-liquidation groups 
with various purposes, including appeasing the workers, checking assets 
and debts or maintain the operating order of a listed company.46 They also 
39 The information is available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2014-06-27/1200011487.
PDF (visited 8 July 2015).
40 The information is available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-08-19/58322473.PDF 
(visited 8 July 2015).
41 See (n 21 above), p 21.
42 It can be seen in reorganisaiton of *ST Dixian B, S*ST Guangming and *ST Chaori.
43 This kind of group was seen in the reorgnisation of *ST Jinhua.
44 This kind of group was seen in the reorganisation of S*ST Lanbao.
45 The information is available at http://finance.ifeng.com/news/industry/20081013/176857.shtml 
(visited 8 July 2015).
46 See the various working groups formed by the Yichun Municipal Government in the 
reorganisation of S*ST Guangming for example, available at http://epaper.stcn.com/paper/zqsb/
html/2008-10/13/content_34937.htm (visited 5 January 2016).
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help provide first-hand information of the overall condition of the listed 
company to the local governments. Local governments take the initiative 
to propose a list of candidates from the interim groups to the people’s 
court. The people’s court designated these pre-organised working groups 
as the administrator in 36 cases, because they are more familiar with the 
overall situation of the listed company than social intermediaries. In 
order to reduce people’s questioning on the legitimacy of the liquidation 
group, local governments do solicit some professionals, such as lawyers 
and accountants, and make them members of the liquidation group.47
The recommendation of candidates to be designated as the 
administrator by local governments is very informal and illegal. The 
people’s court should generally appoint the administrator publicly from 
a roster of administrators by random means, such as taking turns, casting 
lots or applying lottery numbers as is required by the Administrator 
Designation Provisions.48 These methods help to reduce black box 
operation in designating an administrator. It could also minimise the 
subjectivity of the people’s court in selecting qualified candidates.49 
Article 22 of the Administrator Designation Provisions stipulates 
that the people’s court may designate an administrator out of social 
intermediary institutions included on the roster of administrators 
recommended by the financial regulatory institution for bankruptcy 
of commercial banks, securities and insurance companies or any other 
financial institutions after administrative liquidation.50 Three points are 
worth noting. First, concerning the eligible institutions, it is the financial 
regulatory institution, not the local governments that should make such a 
recommendation. Second, the recommendation can only be made in the 
bankruptcy of special types of enterprises, mainly financial institutions. 
Last but not the least, the administrator should be recommended from 
the roster of social intermediary agencies, not from the local government 
departments. According to Art 22 of the Administrator Designation 
Provisions, that is, the administrator recommended by the financial 
regulatory institution should be law, accountancy and/or liquidation firms 
but not government officials.
The recommendation method of the administrator is indeed efficient 
and convenient. The pre-organised quasi-liquidation groups are very 
familiar with the overall conditions of the listed companies that fall 
into financial distress and with preliminary reorganisation work that 
47 As discussed, the mixed-type liquidation group accounts for 73.3% (33/45) of listed companies.
48 Art 20 of the Administrator Designation Provisions.
49 See Xiaoming Xi (ed) (n 13 above), pp 69, 81–84.
50 Art 22 of the Administrator Designation Provisions.
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has been done. It therefore seems reasonable and more efficient for the 
people’s court to designate such liquidation groups or working groups as 
the administrator rather than social intermediaries. The latter have little 
knowledge about the general situation of the listed companies as they are 
often excluded from participating in the prior-reorganisation work of the 
listed companies.
Such means to designate various working groups as the administrator 
in the reorganisation of listed companies is inappropriate. First, prior-
intervention of local governments in dispatching various working 
groups into bankrupt listed companies deprives social intermediaries of 
the opportunity to be designated as the administrator after the people’s 
court accepts the bankruptcy application of/against listed companies. 
The people’s court in practice loses its authority in designating the 
administrator as it does not and cannot reject the recommendation of 
local governments on the candidates for administrator, even though the 
composition of the liquidation group violates the 2006 EBL. For example, 
both the leaders and members in the reorganisation of S*ST Pianzhuan 
are from local SASACs, and the group leader is the head or deputy head 
of local SASACs.51 Obviously, they have close interest relations with the 
reorganisation of local listed SOEs—they are the representatives of the 
shareholders of local listed SOEs—the local governments or SOEs directly 
or indirectly controlled by them. Notwithstanding that the existence of 
the conflict of interests violates Art 24 of the 2006 EBL,52 the people’s 
court does accept all such recommendations from local governments. 
Furthermore, the means that the local governments apply to make 
such recommendations is ambiguous to the stakeholders of the listed 
companies. It adds the possibility that local governments and the people’s 
court may collude together to protect the interests of local governments 
by sacrificing the interests of creditors.53 It is also true that in most cases 
where the liquidation group is the administrator, the absolute priority 
rule is violated to give better protection to the shareholders, especially 
51 See Appendix A for the leaders of the liquidation group in the reorganisation of listed companies, 
such as S*ST Changling, *ST Guangxia and *ST Pianzhuan.
52 See Art 24 of the 2006 EBL:
“… under any of the following circumstances, one shall not assume the post of bankruptcy 
administrator: (1) having been given a criminal punishment for deliberate crime; 
(2) having been deprived of the relevant practice qualification certificate or related 
specialty; (3) having any interest relation to the case; or (4) being under any other 
circumstance where the people’s court deems it improper to act as a bankruptcy 
administrator”.
53 钱丽红/Lihong Qian, “破产管理人选任相关问题探析 [Analysis on the Designation of 
Bankruptcy Administrators]” in 王欣新/Xinxin Wang and 尹正友/Zhengyou Yin (eds), 破产法
论坛 [Bankruptcy Forum] (北京: 法律出版社/Beijing: Law Press, Vol 2, 2009), p 165.
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the controlling shareholders, SASACs or SOEs, at the expense of large 
creditors. It is further discussed in Section 4(b).
3.  Creditors’ Meeting and Committee Lacking Power to Protect 
Interests of Creditors
Creditors’ meeting and creditor committee are also important bankruptcy 
institutions. Creditors have a primary economic stake in the outcome of 
the bankruptcy proceedings. They may lose confidence in the bankruptcy 
proceedings that alleged to protect their interests, when their participation 
in important decision-making processes in the reorganisation of listed 
companies to protect their own rights and interests cannot be secured.54 
Actually, big creditors—the banks or other financial institutions—are in a 
good position to provide professional advice and assistance as they possess 
more financial and operational information than other stakeholders 
concerning the debtor’s business. They can better monitor the activities 
of the administrator. Their participation could provide a means of check 
and balance against possible abuse of the reorganisation proceedings by 
the people’s court and the administrator, against excessive administrative 
costs, as well as act as the means to process and distribute information 
on the listed companies. The UNCITRAL encourages its member states 
to facilitate the participation of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, 
provide a mechanism for the appointment of the creditors’ committee, 
ensure the rights of creditors to access the bankruptcy information, and 
to specify the functions and responsibilities of the creditors’ meeting and 
creditors’ committee in their bankruptcy laws.55
In response to the UNCITRAL, the creditors’ committee is introduced 
into the 2006 EBL for the first time and the power of the creditors’ 
meeting has also been strengthened. Both institutions have a wide range 
of powers in the bankruptcy process of enterprises. According to Art 61 
of the 2006 EBL, the creditors’ meeting has the power to examine and 
approve the rights of the creditors, file an application at the people’s court 
to replace the administrator according to Art 22 of the 2006 EBL, and 
examine the expenses and remunerations of the administrator, supervise 
the administrator, decide on whether a reorganisation plan should be 
approved, as well as conciliation, management plans of the debtor’s assets, 
conversion plan and distribution plan of the insolvent assets.56 These 
54 See UNCITRAL (n 9 above), p 182.
55 Ibid., p 200.
56 Art 61 of the 2006 EBL.
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functions of the creditors’ meeting help to protect the core interests 
of creditors in the bankruptcy process. The functions and duties of the 
creditors’ committee include supervising the management and disposal of 
the debtors’ assets, supervising the distribution of the bankruptcy assets, 
proposing to hold creditors’ meetings, and performing other functions 
and duties as entrusted at creditors’ meetings.57 Nevertheless, the two 
institutions turn into rubber stamps in practice as they fail to supervise 
the administrators or to decide on major reorganisation matters in the 
reorganisation of listed companies.
There are both legal and practical impediments that inhibit these two 
institutions from gaining a stronghold in the reorganisation process of 
listed companies in China. In the legal design of bankruptcy institutions, 
the administrator is placed at the centre of the bankruptcy system under 
the 2006 EBL.58 Designed as a professional, impartial and fair institution, 
the administrator controls and conducts the whole reorganisation process 
of listed companies, including disposing the debtor’s assets, confirming 
the claims of creditors, making reorganisation plans and distributing 
the proceeds from asset disposal of the debtor. The administrator 
has a wide range of powers which could produce direct impact on the 
interests of stakeholders, especially the creditors. The creditors’ meeting 
and committee could check and balance the extensive powers of the 
administrator, and supervise and even may apply with the people’s court 
to replace the administrator when it fails to perform or fulfil its duties 
and functions in lawful and impartial manner.59 However, these powers as 
entrusted by the 2006 EBL are greatly restricted by the stronger authority 
of liquidation group in practice.
(a) Power of Creditors’ Meeting to Replace Administrator
According to Art 22(2) of the 2006 EBL, applications can be filed by the 
creditors to the people’s court to replace the administrator at creditors’ 
meetings due to the following reasons: 
 (1) the administrator either cannot perform its duties in accord-
ance with the law or unable to impartially do so or
 (2)  other conditions result in the incompetence of the administrator 
to fulfil its duties.
57 Art 67 of the 2006 EBL.
58 邹海林/Hailin Zou, “新企业破产法与管理人中心主义 [The New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
and The Administrator Centrism]” (2006) 6 华东政法学院学报 / Journal of the East China 
University of Political Science and Law 121, 122.
59 Arts 22, 23, 61 and 69 of the 2006 EBL.
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With the bankruptcy process mainly protecting the interests of creditors, 
they should be allowed to express their opinions and have a role in this 
process as the designation of the administrator directly influences their 
interests.60 Th e right of the creditors to apply for the replacement of the 
administrator is a check and balance on the possible abuse of the power of 
the administrator. However, in practice, the creditors’ meeting does not 
have much say in the replacement of the administrator who does abuse its 
powers and prejudice the interests of creditors, especially the liquidation-
group administrator.
Liquidation groups have been designated in the reorganisation of 75% 
(36/45) of the listed companies. Some of the liquidation groups consist of 
pure government officials or officials from the SASACs at various levels; 
the rest were mixed with officials both from local governments or SASACs 
and social intermediaries. Most of the group leaders were government 
officials or head of the local SASACs. In practice, they possess great 
decision-making powers in the reorganisation of listed companies. Yet 
this type of formation of the liquidation group violates Arts 22(2) and 24 
of the 2006 EBL. The local governments are the shareholders of some of 
the bankrupt listed companies. They have direct interest relations with 
the reorganisation of the listed companies. According to Art 24 of the 
2006 EBL, one shall not assume the post of the administrator if s/he has 
interest relations with the bankruptcy case because the impartiality of 
administrators would be under threat if designated as the administrator. 
However, in practice, the limitations on qualification of being designated 
as the administrator under the 2006 EBL does not prove to be a serious 
consideration for the people’s court to reject the recommendation 
of government-official candidates by the local governments to be 
designated as the administrator. On the one hand, local governments 
often intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings of the listed companies 
before they enter into the reorganisation procedure. Creditors usually 
have little access to information about the possible composition of the 
liquidation group in the reorganisation of the listed companies before 
hand. And on the other hand, because of the prior-intervention of local 
governments through various interim working groups dispatched to the 
listed companies which fall into financial distress, quasi-liquidation 
groups then become the most appropriate candidate for the administrator. 
They have good knowledge of the overall conditions of the listed 
companies, including financial, operating, commercial relations and 
the like. In some cases, such as the reorganisation of *ST Huayuan and 
60 安建/Jian An (ed), 中华人民共和国企业破产法释义 [Interpretation of the PRC’s EBL] (北京: 
法律出版社/Beijing: Law Press China, 2006), p 38.
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S*ST Lanbao, the working groups have even successfully reached primary 
investment intention with new investors and completed the preliminary 
reorganisation plans.61 Therefore, it seems rational and reasonable to 
designate various working groups as the administrator to continue their 
work under such circumstances. The people’s court does designate them 
as administrators although they are aware that such a composition of the 
liquidation group does not correspond to Art 24 of the 2006 EBL. At 
this time of period, it is objectively impossible for the creditors to oppose 
such a designation, as the creditors’ meeting and committee have not yet 
been formed.62
During the reorganisation process of the listed companies, it is very 
difficult for creditors to exercise their rights at the creditors’ meetings to 
replace the liquidation-group administrator who obviously has interest 
relations with the listed companies. Most of the creditors other than 
some big creditors are actually excluded from the drafting process of the 
reorganisation plan carried out by the liquidation-group administrator. 
Hence, they cannot bargain for the treatment of their claims in the plan. 
Their interests are most affected among all stakeholders. For example, in 
the reorganisation plan of *ST Dixian B, general creditors only received 
2% of their claims back, while the shareholders’ equity were not reduced, 
a very unfair result for general creditors who should have enjoyed higher 
priority in terms of the distribution of the bankruptcy estate.
In the reorganisation process, the interests of creditors are more easily 
prejudiced in cases with liquidation group as the administrator. This does 
not mean that the interests of the creditors would be negatively affected 
in every case where the liquidation group was designated. There is a 
possibility that the liquidation group treats both creditors and shareholders 
fairly.63 However, the interests of the creditors and shareholders directly 
conflict with each other in the reorganisation of listed companies whose 
reorganisation plans are crammed down by the people’s court. There are 
12 such cases among the 45 listed companies. Figure 6 shows that the 
average repayment rate of the cramdown cases is 13.58%,64 far less than 
61 See also 许美征/Meizheng Xu, “尽快制定上市公司管理人制度的司法解释 [Judicial 
Interpretations of the Administrator System Should be Made As Soon As Possible]” in 王欣新/
Xinxin Wang and 尹正友/Zhengyou Yin (eds), 破产法论坛 [Bankruptcy Forum] (北京: 法律出
版社/Beijing: Law Press China, Vol 4, 2009), p 208.
62 The creditors’ meeting is convened after the end of the period of declaration of the creditor’s 
rights according to the 2006 EBL. In most of the cases, the liquidation group is designated by 
the people’s court when it accepts the reorganisation application.
63 For example, the equity of the controlling shareholder, Baoji Municipal SASAC was cut by 
80% and the repayment rate to the creditors of S*ST Changling was 18%. Similar treatments 
to controlling shareholders and creditors which is comparatively fairer could also be seen in the 
reorganisation of *ST Taibai and *ST Qinling. See Appendix A for more information.
64 See works referred to in note 22.
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the average repayment rate of cases without cramdown, which is 27.97%.65 
As the repayment rates in these cases were too low, the creditors objected 
to the reorganisation plans. The liquidation-group administrators in 
these cases paid little heed to the objection of the creditors. Table 1 
shows that the reorganisation plans that they drafted and proposed 
were not amended after being rejected by the creditors. The liquidation 
groups submitted such reorganisation plans to the people’s court and the 
people’s court confirmed all these plans66 accordingly without further 
questioning their legality and fairness. Among these cases, the creditors 
in only one reorganisation case, *ST Guangxia issued a statement that 
requested the replacement of the liquidation group which was dominated 
by government officials.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the liquidation 
group fails to perform its duties impartially as stipulated in Art 22(2) of 
the 2006 EBL in terms of its formation and the preferential treatment 
to shareholders than to creditors. Creditors hence have a reason to 
make requests to the people’s court to replace the liquidation-group 
65 Ibid.
66 All 12 cramdown cases issued the announcements on the confirmation of the reorganisation 
plans after they received the rulings of the people’s court to confirm the plans. All such 
announcements could be found at the website of CNINFO.
Figure 6: Comparison of Average Repayment Rate between 
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administrator. However, three possible reasons may discourage the 
creditors to do so. One reason is that the formation of the liquidation 
group is approved and designated by the people’s court. The court 
explicitly approved of the presence of local officials in the reorganisation 
of the listed companies although there exists conflict of interests. 
Furthermore, alternative options are lacking for the administrator and 
the cost to replace the administrator is high. Most of the reorganisation 
work has been conducted by the liquidation group already. Their effort 
and time spent in preparing the reorganisation plans would be in vain 
if they were to be replaced. As most of the listed companies had been 
marked with *ST to denote their delisting risks or their listing has 
already been suspended, they would either be delisted from the stock 
exchange or their listing would be terminated if they could not make 
a profit during their reorganisation within one year from the day they 
were marked with delisting risks or would have their listing suspended. 
The local governments would therefore prohibit the people’s court from 
replacing the incumbent liquidation group within such a limited time 
frame to save on time to implement reorganisation plans afterwards to 
avoid the listed companies’ being delisted or marked with delisting risks. 
Last but not least, there is no other relief mechanism available in the 
2006 EBL if the request of creditors to replace the administrator was 
rejected by the people’s court.67 Hence, there is little motive for creditors 
to make such a request to replace the liquidation group under current 
circumstances.
(b)  Attitude of People’s Court and Administrator towards Protection 
of Creditors’ Rights
In practice, the administrator intentionally sets up obstructions for the 
creditors to participate in important bankruptcy matters, such as the 
drafting of the reorganisation plans and soliciting strategic investors. 
It renders the role of the creditors’ meeting and committees as merely 
a figurehead. The deep concern of the liquidation-group administrator 
is that the diligence of the creditors in reorganisation matters may 
procrastinate the reorganisation process of listed companies68 as the time 
67 Neither the 2006 EBL nor the Administrator Designation Provisions stipulate what other reliefs 
to which the creditors could turn when their application of replacing the administrator was 
rejected by the people’s court. Neither is appeal procedure provided.
68 For instance, in the reorganisation of S*ST Haina, the liquidation group had only two months 
of time to reorganise it. The liquidation group avoided any chances for the active participation 
of creditors during the process. The reorganisation plan was finally rejected by creditors and 
crammed down by the people’s court.
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left is rather limited to rescue the listed companies, avoiding their listing 
status being suspended or even terminated. Some listed companies may 
be delisted if they are unable to produce profits in a specific period of 
time in accordance with the Stock Listing Rules of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE),69 as most of the 
listed companies that enter into the reorganisation process have been 
operating at a loss for three consecutive financial years. Accordingly, if 
reorganisation could be carried out faster and in due process, there is the 
greater possibility that they can make a profit to avoid being delisted. 
Hence, the liquidation-group administrator is reluctant to get the creditors 
involved under such time constraint. They intentionally create obstacles 
to the creditors in the discussion of the details of the reorganisation.70 
In practice, it is very difficult for creditors to effectively discuss with the 
administrator when given short notice about the agenda of the creditor 
meeting and without much detail. In most cases, the creditors only obtain 
details of the reorganisation plan and arrangement of their claims a few 
hours before creditors’ meeting.71
These obstacles have rendered the creditors’ meeting and committee 
very weak. The 2006 EBL is expected to better protect the interests and 
legal rights of creditors, yet it does not work well in the reorganisation 
practice of listed companies in China. From the above discussion, it can 
be concluded that both substantial and procedural rights and interests of 
the creditors are prejudiced by the liquidation-group administrator. The 
power of the creditors to replace the liquidation-group administrator has 
no bite in practice. Its legal rights granted by the 2006 EBL to participate 
in the reorganisation of listed companies are also undermined by the 
administrator as well as by the people’s courts in order to suppress the 
enthusiasm of the creditors to secure enough time to rescue the listed 
companies. Concerning their treatments in the reorganisation process, 
the liquidation-group administrator does care the interests of shareholders 
more than theirs.
69 See eg, r 14.3.1 of the Stock Listing Rules of SZSE.
70 李宝贵/Baogui Li and 王兆同/Zhaotong Wang, “错位与还原: 破产管理人、债权人会议
与人民法院角色定位 [Malposition and Restoration: Correct Role of the Administrator, 
Creditors’ Meeting and the People’s Court],” in 王欣新/Xinxin Wang and 尹正友/Zhengyou 
Yin (eds), 破产法论坛 [Bankruptcy Forum] (北京: 法律出版社/Beijing: Law Press China, Vol 5, 
2010), p 243.
71 Roman Tomasic and Zinan Zhang, “From Enterprise Bankruptcy Law Making to Implementation: 
Convergence and Divergence in Corporate Rescue and Reorganization Law and Practice in 
China”, paper presented to the conference, The Trend of Corporate Governance and Corporation 
Law Convergence in the Economic Globalization, the 21st Century Commercial Law Forum-Eleventh 
International Symposium, Beijing, China, November 12–13, 2011, p 352.
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4.  Lack of Independence of the People’s Court in Confirmation of 
Reorganisation Plans
The judicial system is at the heart of the insolvency infrastructure.72 
Smooth implementation of the bankruptcy law depends on an effective 
and independent judiciary system. The people’s court is the institution that 
applies the bankruptcy law, and conclusively establishes the bankruptcy 
law in the cases that appear before them. The bankruptcy law can guide 
the parties only if the judges apply the law correctly.73 The people’s court 
in China has demonstrated great difference from its counterpart in the 
US in terms of the adjudication of bankruptcy reorganisation of listed 
companies. The role of the people’s court in accepting the reorganisation 
applications and confirming the reorganisation plans of listed companies 
is discussed in this section.
(a)  Role of the People’s Court and Government in Accepting 
Reorganisation Applications of Listed Companies
In terms of the acceptance of reorganisation applications of listed 
companies, the courts in western countries can and should independently 
decide on the acceptance of such a case. The decision whether to accept 
the application or not should be based on whether the commencement 
standards of the bankruptcy procedures explicitly stipulated in bankruptcy 
law have been met. However, in China, the acceptance of reorganisation 
applications is neither decided according to the commencement 
standards of the reorganisation procedure, nor it is exclusively decided by 
the people’s court in accordance with the 2006 EBL, as the government 
intentionally gets itself involved in the process.
The people’s court cannot accept a reorganisation application 
without approval from the local governments by means of a “letter of 
commitment to maintain social stability” in practice. A complete and 
complex procedure for the acceptance of the reorganisation of listed 
companies centres on the approval of the government. In the new complex 
procedure that is different from that in the 2006 EBL, approval from the 
government is most critical in this complex procedure in practice. If the 
government refuses to issue a letter of commitment in that it supports 
the reorganisation of a listed company, the people’s court will not accept 
72 OECD, “Building Sound Insolvency Systems in the MENA Region”, available at http://www.
oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/42551472.pdf (visited 8 December 2013), p 6.
73 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 
p 219.
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the reorganisation application as it lacks necessary resources to deal with 
such problems. The SPC makes it clear that applicants, creditors, the 
debtor or shareholders, in addition to the materials set forth in Art 8 of 
the 2006 EBL, are to submit a report on the reorganisation feasibility of 
the listed company, briefing materials sent by the provincial government 
at the place of the domicile of the listed company to the securities 
regulatory authority, the opinion of the CSRC, and plans issued by the 
local government for the maintenance of stability.74 The listed company 
is to submit a feasible plan for resettling workers when it files a voluntary 
reorganisation application.75
The requirements for a letter of commitment and stability-maintenance 
plan by local governments have many negative effects. They increase the 
difficulties of financially distressed or bankrupt listed companies to obtain 
access to reorganisation. The SPC has added many extra requirements, 
such as a pre-plan by the government to maintain social stability, which 
were not required under the 2006 EBL. Such requirements give the 
government greater means to become involved in the reorganisation of 
listed companies. First, these requirements increase the time and funds 
required for listed companies to prepare the materials, thus delaying their 
commencement of the reorganisation procedure in a timely manner. 
Secondly, support from the local governments becomes a key element 
or necessary condition for the people’s court in order to accept the 
reorganisation application of a listed company. It is possible in theory 
that a bankrupt listed company that meets the standards to commence 
their application as stipulated in the 2006 EBL could be denied access if 
the government deems that it is inappropriate for them to be reorganised.
In the complex new procedure developed in practice that is different 
from that in the 2006 EBL, approval from the government is the most 
crucial factor for the acceptance of a bankruptcy application by the people’s 
court. In essence, it is not the people’s court that makes the decision. The 
power to decide on the acceptance of a bankruptcy application is actually 
transferred from the people’s court to the local governments. If the local 
government does not issue a letter of commitment to show its support, 
the people’s court will not accept the application, as the SPC will not 
provide subsequent approval based on the approval of local governments 
to maintain social stability.76
74 See Art 3 of 最高人民法院印发《关于审理上市公司破产重整案件工作座谈会纪要》的通知 
[Notice of the SPC to Print and Distribute Summary of the Colloquium on the Trial of the 
Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Listed Companies], available at http://www.chinainsol.org/show.
aspx?id=6849&cid=6 (visited 29 April 2015).
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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(b)  Influence of Government on the People’s Court: Confirmation of 
Reorganisation Plans
(i) Prominent features of reorganisation of listed companies
After eight years of practice since the taking into effect of the 2006 EBL, 
the confirmation of the reorganisation plans by the people’s court in 
China presents prominent features in comparison with the US model, 
in terms of the length of time required to confirm a plan, the rate of 
confirmation and the consummation rate of the reorganisation plans.
With respect to the length of time to confirm reorganisation plans, 
it is much shorter for the people’s court in China to confirm them as 
opposed to the US courts. According to the empirical study carried out 
by the author on the reorganisation of 45 listed companies in China, it 
takes 165.8 days (5 months) on average for listed companies to reach 
a confirmed plan.77 In the US practice, the median time to reach a 
confirmed plan was about 9 months from 1994 to 2002, according to a 
study conducted by Warren and Westbrook on the practice of Ch 11.78 It 
does appear that the reorganisation process is faster in China.
Furthermore, the confirmation rate of the reorganisation plans of 
listed companies in China is as high as 100%.79 This means that all of 
the reorganisation plans are successfully confirmed by the people’s court. 
Among the 45 listed companies, the reorganisation plans of 33 companies 
were approved by the creditors and confirmed accordingly by the people’s 
court. The plans of the remaining 12 companies were rejected by the 
creditors and crammed down by the people’s court. As a comparison, the 
respective confirmation rate was 30.3% in 1994 and 33.4% in 2002 in 
the US, according to Warren and Westbrook.80 The confirmation rate 
of the reorganisation plans in China is therefore much higher than that 
in the US.
Last but not least, the consummation rate of confirmed plans is 
95.6% in China.81 It should be noted that the implementation of the 
reorganisation plans is divided into two stages: debt restructuring and 
asset restructuring. The consummation of confirmed plans actually means 
the accomplishment of debt restructuring only. In China, the debtor is 
responsible for implementing the confirmed plan and the administrator 
77 See Appendix B for detail.
78 Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, “The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to 
Critics” (2009) 107 Michigan Law Review 603, 629.
79 See Appendix B for detail. Reorganisation plans of the 45 listed companies were all confirmed 
by the people’s court.
80 Ibid., pp 611–615.
81 The reorganisation plans of *ST Xiake and *ST Hongsheng are in the implementation process. 
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supervises its implementation.82 The administrator would file a supervision 
report to the people’s court when the debtor fulfils its obligation to repay 
all of its debts in accordance with the confirmed reorganisation plan. The 
people’s court accordingly makes a ruling to confirm the accomplishment 
of the debtor in repaying its debt as contained in the plan. The debt 
reduced by the plan is hence exempted under such circumstances and 
the supervisory duty of the administrator accordingly comes to an end.83 
Among the 45 listed companies, only two cases, *ST Shentai and *ST 
Pianzhuan, completed debt repayment and asset restructuring during the 
implementation period as specified in their confirmed reorganisation 
plan.84 In comparison, an empirical study showed that the consummation 
rate in the US was about 58% in the 1990s.85 More updated empirical 
data are not available. The average time used for the consummation of 
reorganisation plans in China is 239.5 days,86 which is comparatively 
shorter as the time for asset restructuring is not taken into account.
The average time for the confirmation of reorganisation plans is 
quite short yet the rates of confirmation and consummation are very 
high in China. It is reasonable to expect that not all listed companies 
that enter reorganisation proceedings could come up with a feasible 
reorganisation plan and not all the confirmed plans would be completed 
within the implementation period. Considering that SOEs account for 
the largest proportion of listed companies that undergo reorganisation 
and the market is under the macroeconomic control of the government 
in the socialist market economy of China,87 it would not be surprising 
that the government greatly impacts the people’s court in confirming 
reorganisation plans as it has strong economic and political motives for 
doing so.
The primary and direct goal of the government is to preserve the 
listing status of bankrupt listed companies. As a large proportion of the 
listed companies entering into the reorganisation procedure have already 
been marked with *ST after making losses for two consecutive years or 
their listing had been suspended (see Appendix D), time is very limited 
82 Arts 89 and 90 of the 2006 EBL.
83 All 45 listed companies issued such public announcements on the completion of their 
reorganisation plans and the termination of administrators’ supervisory duty.
84 Information about consummation of the reorganisation plans of *ST Shentai is available at 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-09-03/58395359.PDF and of *ST Pianzhuan is 
available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/disclosure/szse_main/bulletin_detail/true/57
962076?announceTime=2010-05-18%2006:30 (visited 24 July 2015).
85 Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, “Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1979–1988” (1993) 78 Cornell Law Review 597, 600.
86 Please see Appendix B for detail.
87 See s 2.4.I.B, Ch II.
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for them to make efforts to meet the requirements of the SSE and SZSE 
to avoid being delisted or the compulsory termination of their listing.88 
The y have to make a profit within the third or fourth year, among 
other requirements. Hence, in practice, the government intervenes to 
ensure that the reorganisation (debt-repayment) could be finished in the 
prescribed time so that these listed companies could confirm their income 
from debt-repayment and are exempted from any remaining repayment 
obligations. In fact, 69% of the listed companies chose to confirm their 
income from debt restructuring in the same year of their reorganisation.89 
Sub stantial income from this confirmation greatly improves their balance 
sheets as “net profits attributable to shareholders of listed companies” 
turned from negative to positive.90 The people’s court actually plays a 
crucial role in confirming their reorganisation plans. According to 
this empirical study, most of the reorganisation plans did not meet the 
requirements stipulated in the 2006 EBL. However, in practice, they all 
have been confirmed, especially non-consensual plans crammed down by 
the people’s court.91 This issue is discussed in Section 4(b)(ii).
(ii)  Confirmation of reorganisation plans of listed companies by people’s court
As discussed above, among the 45 listed companies, creditors in 33 cases 
consented to the reorganisation plans while in 12 cases vetoed them. The 
people’s court crammed down the 12 reorganisation plans that did not 
receive consensus. In examining all of these plans, it appeared that most 
of them did not meet the requirements prescribed in the 2006 EBL. A 
total of 80% of the reorganisation plans92 (36/45) lack feasible operation 
schemes. They actually protect the interests of shareholders more and 
prejudice the legal rights and interests of the creditors. Some of the plans 
should not have been confirmed by the people’s court because their 
chances of successfully reorganising their company in accordance with 
the confirmed plans are slim.93 For example, the asset restructuring of 
listed companies, such as S*ST Xingmei and *ST Guangxia, have not 
88 See eg, r 14.4.1 on the Compulsory Termination of Listing of SZSE.
89 丁燕/Yan Ding, 上市公司破产重整计划法律问题研究——理念、规则与实证 [Legal Issues 
Concerning Reorganisation Plans of Listed Companies—Ideas, Rules and Empirical Study] (北京: 法
律出版社/Beijing: Law Press China, 2014) p 178.
90 See the confirmation of such income in reorganisation of *ST Deheng for example, available at 
http://www.p5w.net/today/201108/t3788021.htm (visited 12 July 2015).
91 See Table 1 Reorganisation Plans Crammed Down by the People’s Court.
92 See Appendix C for detail. Only nine listed companies among the 45 had concrete and clear 
operation schemes and 36 lacked such feasible schemes.
93 For instance, reorganisation plans of *ST Guangxia and *ST Xinye were confirmed by the 
people’s court through cramdown. Although the debt repayment was finished smoothly, their 
asset restructuring was extraordinarily difficult. Until present, *ST Guangxia has been marked 
with delisting risks.
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been finished even to the present day due to lack of feasible operation 
schemes. Notwithstanding the fact that it may be extremely difficult 
for listed companies to sustain themselves after reorganisation (debt 
restructuring in a narrow sense), the local government has placed a great 
amount of pressure onto all parties: the shareholders, the creditors and 
the people’s court to reorganise them.
A. Lack of feasible operation schemes
According to Art 81 of the 2006 EBL, the draft of the reorganisation plan 
should have an operation scheme. An operation scheme is a whole set of 
measures that incur changes to the business of the debtor to rescue the 
business, ending the losses and restoring its profitability.94
The measures may include transferring part of the assets or businesses, 
changing the controlling rights of the company, merger and acquisition, 
changing the business strategy and managerial class and the like.95 The 
operation schemes of these listed companies are necessarily different as 
their financial and business conditions vary. However, all schemes should 
be feasible. They should have detailed arrangements on fund raising, their 
usage and asset restructuring.96 Article 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code of 
the US provides that, in principle, measures of plans should provide 
adequate means for the implementation of the plan so that the creditors 
and shareholders can make reasonable judgment on the feasibility of the 
plan when voting. Article 87 of the 2006 EBL also stipulates that the 
operation schemes in the reorganisation should be feasible, or the debtor 
or the administrator cannot submit the reorganisation plan rejected by 
the creditors to the people’s court for confirmation. The reorganisation 
process usually takes a long time and costs a significant amount of 
money. Reorganisation plans should be detailed enough for creditors and 
shareholders to make rational decisions on whether they should approve 
them.97 The reorganisation of enterprises has many risks. If the plans 
are detailed and feasible, then the success rate of the reorganisation will 
be greatly increased. It is necessary that the operation schemes in the 
reorganisation plans should be feasible under such circumstances.
There are many problems with the operation schemes of the listed 
companies in China. First and foremost, the operation schemes are very 
simple.98 The reorganisation plan of S*ST Haina did not even have 
94 See Jian An (ed) (n 60 above) p 116.
95 See Yan Ding (n 89 above) p 90.
96 Ibid.
97 王卫国/Weiguo Wang, 破产法精义 [Essence of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (北京: 法律出版社/
Beijing: Law Press China, 2007) p 244.
98 See Appendix C for the characteristics of the operation schemes in the reorganisation plans of 
the 45 listed companies.
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an operation scheme.99 Appendix C shows that among the 45 listed 
companies, one has no operation scheme and 27 only have anticipated 
activities that may help the company. Typical comments about these 
types of schemes made by the administrators in the reorganisation plans 
are that the company had lost the ability to make profits, hence it needed 
to find a restructuring party to reorganise its assets and/or business; the 
restructuring party has to inject quality assets into the debtor company 
to restore its profitability.100 Listed companies with such schemes do not 
embark on finding restructuring parties at the time of submitting the 
reorganisation plan for the creditors’ approval. The operation schemes of 
seven companies101 confirmed the presence of a restructuring party, but 
they were simple and lacked concrete steps for the asset restructuring, 
such as the scheme of *ST Shengrun.102 The operation schemes of nine 
companies103 had concrete and clear steps for asset restructuring, such as 
the scheme of *ST Hailong.104 A concrete and clear operation scheme 
does increase the chances for a bankrupt listed company to be successfully 
restructured.
However in China, the operation scheme has become a formality 
in practice. Stakeholders have found that it is difficult to vote on such 
unclear operation schemes, and the people’s court is unable to examine 
their feasibility. It has greatly deviated from the original intention of the 
2006 EBL.
Furthermore, Appendix C shows that 14 companies confirm the 
restructuring party in their operation schemes; 4 find parties with the 
intention of restructuring the debtor, 26 anticipate activities but did 
not confirm the restructuring party.105 The necessity for the presence 
of a restructuring party in the operation scheme has been debated. 
Many Chinese academics have argued for its necessity and there are 
many reasons. First, it would be difficult for those who are drafting 
the reorganisation plans to coordinate debt-for-equity conversion of 
 99 The reorganisation plan of S*ST Haina is available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2007-11-26/35533651.PDF (visited 12 July 2015).
100 See the reorgansiation plan of *ST Jiufa, *ST Danhua, *ST Pianzhuan and *ST Huayuan for 
example and Appendix C for more information.
101 The seven listed companies are S*ST Lanbao, S*ST Zhaohua, S*ST Xingmei, S*ST Changling, 
*ST Shengrun, *ST Guangxia and *ST Baoshuo.
102 See the reorganisation plan of *ST Shengrun, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2010-10-28/58585719.PDF (visited 12 July 2015).
103 They are S*ST Xin’an, *ST Shentai, *ST Jincheng, *ST Taibai, *ST Hailong, *ST Chaori, 
*ST Qinling, *ST Deheng and *ST Hongsheng.
104 See the reorganisation plan of *ST Hailong, available at http://q.stock.sohu.com/
gg/2012463110055.PDF (visited 12 July 2015).
105 The information is collected from reorganisation plans of the 45 listed companies, available at 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.
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the listed companies if the restructuring party is not confirmed.106 It is 
hence difficult for creditors to estimate the value and appropriateness 
of the debt-for-equity conversion, and further make rational judgments 
on the appropriateness of the debt restructuring and repayment 
arrangements.
Moreover, if the restructuring party cannot be confirmed, those who 
are drafting the reorganisation plans cannot provide subsequent financing 
plans. This leads to the typical problem of reorganisation plans in China: 
most reorganisation plans have no financing plans, but only debt-reduction 
schemes. As mentioned above, the implementation of reorganisation 
plans consists of both debt-repayment and asset-restructuring stages. 
Although the administrator files their supervision report to the people’s 
court and the latter has confirmed the completion of the reorganisation 
proceedings, the fact is that the confirmed completion refers only to the 
completion of debt-repayment—the asset restructuring is not included. 
The first reason is that the government is keen to maintain the listing 
status of listed companies within a limited period of time. The separation 
of these two steps could reduce the time for reorganisation and confirm 
income on the balance sheet from debt-relief schemes. Secondly, major 
asset restructuring of the listed companies needs to be approved by the 
CSRC.107 The time required for the approval of the CSRC and its result 
is uncertain. In fact, 95.6% (43/45) of the listed companies108 started their 
asset restructuring after completion of the debt-repayment.
The vagueness and oversimplification of the contents of the 
operation scheme, uncertainty of the restructuring party and separation 
of debt-repayment and asset restructuring mean that the operation 
schemes in the confirmed reorganisation plans are rather unfeasible. 
Reorganisation plans with such schemes fail to meet the requirements 
of the 2006 EBL. Most of the plans should not be confirmed by 
the people’s court under normal conditions. However, under great 
pressure from the local governments to keep the listing status of the 
listed companies, they were all confirmed by the people’s court. Such 
vagueness and uncertainty in the operation schemes have led to the 
failure of the reorganisation of listed companies in China, which is 
discussed in Section 5(b).
106 See Yan Ding (n 89 above) p 94.
107 “上市公司重大资产重组管理办法 [Measures for Administration of Material Assets 
Reorganisation of Listed Companies]”, available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/
G00306207/200804/t20080429_22638.htm (visited 4 August 2015).
108 *ST Pianzhuan and *ST Shentai conducted debt repayment and asset restructuring at the same 
time.
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B.  Government intervention in cramdown of reorganisation 
plans by people’s court
The government plays a crucial role in the cramdown of reorganisation 
plans by the people’s court in the reorganisation of 12 listed companies 
(see Appendix E). These reorganisation plans contradict the fundamental 
rules of the bankruptcy law, namely the absolute priority rule. This rule 
grants adequate protection to creditors in the reorganisation process of 
listed companies. Government intervention results in better protection 
of the shareholders than the general creditors.
The absolute priority rule requires payment in full to a senior class 
before any payment can be made to those who are more junior. This rule 
is only utilised when a court confirms a plan over the objection of a class/
es that the plan is not fair and equitable. It is derived from Ch 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code of the US and codified in Arts 82, 87 and 113 of the 
2006 EBL. Creditors generally enjoy absolute priority over shareholders 
when liquidation takes place. Shareholders cannot be paid before 
creditors who enjoy higher priority and who are paid in full in enterprise 
bankruptcies. This rule is often applied in confirming the reorganisation 
plans by the court against the objection of a class/es. For non-cramdown 
cases, creditors, shareholders and other stakeholders have the option 
of negotiating how they are involved in the reorganisation process, as 
long as it does not violate compulsory provisions and principles of the 
bankruptcy law. For cramdown cases, the people’s court has to conduct 
an absolute priority test to ensure that a senior class who enjoy higher 
priority should be paid in full before any junior class is paid.
Among the 45 reorganisation cases, the absolute priority rule was 
breached in 43 cases.109 There are only two exceptional cases in which 
the general creditors were paid 100% of their claims, and that is in the 
reorganisation of *ST Pianzhuan110 and S*ST Beiya.111 As their rights 
have lower priority, shareholders have no rights left whatsoever when the 
debt of the listed companies exceeds their assets. They actually lose their 
control to the creditors over the company.112 In that regard, the equity 
of shareholders should be greatly reduced or should be nil when the 
109 In reorganisation of only two listed companies, *ST Pianzhuan and S*ST Beiya, the principle 
of APR was observed. The general creditors were paid 100% of their credits.
110 See the reorganisation plan of *ST Pianzhuan, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2010-05-18/57962076.PDF (visited 15 July 2015).
111 The repayment rate to general creditors was 19% according to the reorganisation plan of 
S*ST Beiya. It was increased to 100% in the implementation of the reorganisation plan, 
for more information, please see “中航投资控股股份有限公司关于股票恢复上市的公告 
[Announcement of Avic Capital Co Ltd on the Relisting of Company Stocks]”, available at 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2012-08-23/61464936.PDF (visited 15 July 2015).
112 Manville Corp v Equity Security Holders Comm (In re Johns-Manville Corp) 801 F2d 60 (2d 
Cir 1986).
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debtor company is insolvent. All 45 listed companies were substantially 
insolvent, and the debt to assets ratio was as high as 700%, such as in 
the case of S*ST Zhaohua and *ST Shentai.113 Even so, the shareholder 
equity was not reduced at all in some listed companies, while the claims 
of the creditors were reduced as high as 90% in those cases.
Figure 7 shows that shareholder rights are not reduced in six of the 
cases, while creditors only obtained a very small proportion of their 
claims. It is clear that the interests of the shareholders were placed before 
those of the creditors. Among these six cases, the government is the 
controlling shareholder in S*ST Tianfa, S*ST Haina and S*ST Lanbao. 
The Cangzhou Municipal Government became the second largest 
shareholder of *ST Dixian B after the company entered the reorganisation 
process. Liquidation groups are designated as the administrator for *ST 
Hualong and S*ST Zhaohua. In these cases, shareholder rights are 
much better protected than those of the creditors in the reorganisation 
of listed companies where the state is a controlling shareholder or the 
liquidation group is designated as administrator, that is, when the interest 
of government gets involved in the reorganisation process.
113 See the annual report of S*ST Zhaohua in 2007, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
cninfo-new/disclosure/szse_main/bulletin_detail/true/39119768?announceTime=2008-04-
25%2006:30, and annual report of *ST Shentai in 2008, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2009-04-28/51875298.PDF (visited 13 August 2015). 
Figure 7: Repayment Rates to General Creditors in Reorganisation of 
Listed Companies with Equity of Shareholders Unchanged
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In terms of repayment to the creditors, the average repayment rate 
was 27.97% in the non-cramdown cases, but 13.58% in the cramdown 
cases, which is half of the non-cramdown cases. The reorganisation plans 
of the 12 listed companies were rejected by their creditors or both the 
creditors and shareholders.114 The creditors do not consider that they are 
treated fairly and equitably. For example, in the reorganisation plans of 
S*ST Tianfa and *ST Dixian B, the shareholders, who comprised the 
junior class in the distribution of the bankruptcy assets, were paid in full 
while the creditors only got repayment of their claims as low as 2% (see 
Figure 8).
According to Art 87 of the 2006 EBL, the administrator can submit 
the reorganisation plan to the people’s court for its confirmation only 
if: (1) the repayment rate to the general creditors is no less than the 
liquidation value and (2) the voting group that does not agree to the 
reorganisation plan refuses to vote again or rejects the reorganisation plan 
upon re-voting.115
In terms of the first requirement, the valuation of the assets of 
the listed companies was ambiguous and not made known to the 
general creditors. The liquidation-group administrator may instruct 
114 See Table 1 of Reorganisation Plans Crammed Down by the People’s Court for more details.
115 See Art 87 of the 2006 EBL.
Figure 8: Repayment Rates to Creditors in Cramdown Cases
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government-affiliated evaluating agencies to provide a lower liquidation 
assessment. It then becomes easier to meet this requirement. In fact, 
the creditors have questioned about the assessment process in several 
cases.116 In terms of payment to creditors with the debtor’s shares,117 the 
valuation of the shares is rather crude and simple in comparison with 
the more sophisticated and complex US practice. Some of the listed 
companies, such as *ST Jiufa and *ST Qinling, chose the closing price 
of their shares on the day before the suspension of their share trading.118 
Some, such as *ST Xiaxin and *ST Shentai, applied the average of the 
share price within a certain period near the date of the confirmation 
of the reorganisation plans. However, they failed to state the reason 
for choosing such an appraisal method. They apparently neglected the 
difference between the share price before and after the reorganisation, 
as the price after the reorganisation is often higher. This is also unfair 
to the creditors.
Concerning the second requirement, in practice, most liquidation 
groups do not consult with creditors who have rejected the draft of the 
reorganisation plans to save time or avoid any trouble. Table 1 shows 
that the liquidation group is designated as the administrator in 11 cases 
except for *ST Hongsheng. All reorganisation plans were rejected by the 
creditors at the first voting. It is unclear whether the liquidation group 
negotiated with the creditors for the second time in two of the cases, 
namely S*ST Tianfa and S* ST Tianyi. Among the remaining nine, the 
liquidation group in four of the cases; that is, *ST Baoshuo, *ST Canghua, 
*ST Dixian B and *ST Jincheng, submitted the rejected reorganisation 
plans directly to the people’s court without any consultation or negotiation 
with their creditors. The liquidation groups conducted further negotiation 
with their creditors and shareholders in five cases: *ST Guangxia, *ST 
Jinhua, S*ST Guangming, *ST Xinye and *ST Jincheng. However, 
the negotiation requirement as per the 2006 EBL was only treated as a 
formality. The reorganisation plans were neither amended nor was the 
priority given to creditors any different. Such reorganisation plans were 
vetoed by the creditors again.
116 Creditors and scholars questioned the assessment of value of the bankruptcy assets in the 
reorganisation of *ST Jinhua and *ST Dixian B. For more information, see (n 21 above) 
pp 9–11.
117 Such a debt repayment method could be seen in cases such as *ST Jiufa, *ST Huayuan and 
*ST Qinling.
118 See the reorganisation plans of * ST Jiufa, available at http://file.ws.126.net/quotes/pdf/
sh/2008/2008-12/2008-12-16/381350.pdf and *ST Qinling, available at http://file.ws.126.net/
quotes/pdf/sh/2009/2009-12/2009-12-17/491606.pdf (visited 1 August 2015).
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The confirmation of these reorganisation plans rejected by the 
violated the substantial as well as procedural requirements under Art 87 
of the 2006 EBL. Such plans should not be confirmed by the people’s 
court. However, the people’s court in fact was not independent in 
confirming the reorganisation plans. Table 1 shows that reorganisation 
plans of 11 listed companies were drafted by the liquidation group. As 
members of the liquidation groups are appointed by the people’s court 
upon recommendation of local governments and the interests of local 
governments are involved in the reorganisation of these listed companies, 
the people’s court followed the instructions of the local governments to 
facilitate the preservation of the listing status of the listed companies and 
protection of state-owned assets.
The fundamental justification for the people’s court to cramdown 
reorganisation plans rejected by creditors (and investors) should be 
protecting the public interest. The reason for creditors to reject the 
reorganisation plans is that the creditors and debtors cannot reach an 
agreement on their priority, and on the treatments of their claims and 
equity in reorganisation negotiations (it is doubtful, however, whether 
there is any negotiation between creditors and debtors with the liquidation 
group as the administrator in some cases). It is much easier for the debtor 
to be connected with public interest, because the debtor as a company 
is often a job supplier, tax payer and contributor to the local economy. 
Jobs, taxes and the development of local economy are regarded as public 
interests closely associated with the debtor company.
Protecting the public good provides the government with a sufficient 
reason to intervene in the reorganisation of listed companies. However, 
the cramdown of reorganisation plans may affect the interests of some 
private parties while protecting those of other private parties in the name 
of protecting public good. 119 This is particularly true in the reorganisation 
of listed companies in China. All reorganisation plans, whether they 
have been rejected by creditors or not, are confirmed by the people’s 
court. In some cases, such as the six listed companies with shareholder 
rights unchanged, confirmation by the people’s court is obviously unjust 
as it greatly affects the interests of the creditors.120 For local governments, 
any listed company is worth rescuing and reorganisation plans deserve 
confirmation by the people’s court as long as the repayment rate to 
119 王建平/Jianping Wang (2011) “论破产重整中的利益平衡/On Balance of Interests in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization”, China University of Political Science and Law, PhD Dissertation, 
p 71.
120 See also 王佐发/Zuofa Wang, “上市公司重整中对债权人强裁的公平原则 [The Principle of 
Fairness in the Cram Down Procedure against the Creditors in the Reorganisation of Listed 
Companies]” (2013) 2政治与法/Political Science and Law 34, 38–40.
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creditors is higher than the liquidation value. No government expects to 
see the first liquidation case of listed companies to take place in its own 
jurisdiction, which greatly impairs the image of local government and 
may entail the deterioration of local economy. In the eyes of the people’s 
court and local governments, rescuing listed companies is equivalent to 
protecting public interest. Whether the treatments to creditors are fair 
are not as important as saving the listed company.
It should be noted that the intention of the Chinese lawmakers was 
not to abuse the cramdown power of the people’s court in the bankruptcy 
of enterprises,121 listed or non-listed, SOEs or non-SOEs. As cramdown 
triggers greater expense and more concern over its fairness, it is intended 
to be used rarely.122 The SPC requires that the people’s court shall strictly 
examine the reorganisation plan, comprehensively consider the public 
interests and exercise discretion in a prudential way.123 The threat of 
cramdown is intended to get the parties to negotiate under the shadow 
of confirming the reorganisation plans over the rejection of creditors 
when the prescribed conditions are satisfied. However, in the practice 
of the reorganisation of listed companies, the cramdown mechanism has 
been made use of by the liquidation group to force creditors to accept 
some unfair treatments compared with the treatments of shareholders as 
discussed above.
5. Effects of the Reorganisation under Government Intervention
(a) Duration of Implementation of Reorganisation Plans
The time length of implementing confirmed reorganisation plans in 
China is generally short (see Appendix B). Listed companies are inclined 
to set a period of six months or less as the implementation period in their 
reorganisation plans. Among the 45 listed companies, 20 set six months 
and 11 set less than six months for their implementation period. For 
instance, S*ST Tianfa indicated a period of two months, S*ST Haina 
one month and S*ST Lanbao one month. It is shown in Appendix D that 
68.9% (31/45) of the listed companies set a very short implementation 
121 Art 87 of the 2006 EBL lists many conditions for the cramdown of the reorganisation plans 
rejected by the creditors. When the prescribed conditions are not satisfied, no compulsory 
approval can be made in the name of saving enterprises.
122 See UNCITRAL (n 9 above) pp 226–229.
123 SPC, “最高人民法院关于正确审理企业破产案件为维护市场经济秩序提供司法保障若干
问题的意见 [Opinions of the SPC on Several Issues Concerning Correctly Trying Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Cases to Provide Judicial Protection for Maintaining the Order of Market 
Economy]”, the SPC (6 December 2009), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/
display.aspx?cgid=118100&lib=law (visited 5 January 2016).
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period (six months or less). As most of the listed companies have been 
marked with *ST already because of their losses for two consecutive years 
or had their listing suspended due to making losses for three consecutive 
years,124 a short implementation period could facilitate maintaining or 
resuming their listing status. Listed companies that are not marked with 
*ST or the one which do not have their listing suspended set a much 
longer implementation period as they are not subject to the pressure 
to maintain or resume listing. For instance, S*ST Changling indicated 
a period of 12 months and *ST Jinhua 24 months to implement their 
reorganisation plans.125
(b) Effects of Reorganisation of the Listed Companies
(i) Results of implementation of reorganisation plans
As of July 2015, 95.6% (43/45) of the listed companies who entered 
the reorganisation process have completed the debt-repayment stage, 
except for *ST Hongsheng and *ST Xiake. The asset restructuring of 
most of the listed companies is conducted after debt-repayment. The high 
consummation rate of the confirmed reorganisation plans does not equal 
to high success rate of the reorganisation of these listed companies. Debt-
repayment deals with old debt between the creditors and the debtor. It 
is inadequate to restore the listed company to profitability. The decisive 
factor on whether these companies can sustainably make a profit is the 
asset restructuring. Profitable or viable business is the prerequisite for 
listed companies to return to profitability. As of July 2015, 30 (66.7%) 
of these listed companies have finished their asset restructuring, 
14 (31.1%) have not, and one, *ST Chuangzhi, was delisted at the end.126 
If the successful standards of reorganisation are: (1) the completion of 
both debt-repayment and asset restructuring and (2) resuming of their 
listing or share trading and eliminating the risk of delisting, then the 
reorganisation of 27 listed companies could be regarded as successful. 
The success rate is 62.8% (27 among the 43 listed companies which have 
consummated their reorganisation plans (debt-repayment)). For the rest 
18 reorganisation cases, it is shown in Appendix D that *ST Chuangzhi 
was delisted; *ST Hongsheng and *ST Xiake neither completed their 
debt-repayment nor asset restructuring; the asset restructuring of 
124 See Appendix D for the suspension of listing or trading of the 45 listed companies.
125 See reorganisation plans of S*ST Changling and *ST Jinhua, available at http://www.cninfo.
com.cn/ (visited 1 August 2015) and Appendix D for more detail.
126 “创智信息科技股份有限公司股票终止上市公告 [Delisting Announcement of *ST Chuangzhi]”, 
available at http://www.p5w.net/today/201302/t4716340.htm (visited 10 October 2015).
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12 companies is on-going, and the listing or trading of three listed 
companies have not resumed after the completion of both debt-repayment 
and asset restructuring. For some listed companies with unsuccessful 
reorganisation of their business, they should be in fact delisted from 
stock market to make room for more competitive companies, rather 
than squandering social resources. Some listed companies, such as S*ST 
Xingmei, *ST Guangxia and *ST Hailong, with their asset restructuring 
not completed even after many years, are still marked with delisting risks. 
The reorganisation plan of *ST Hongsheng was confirmed by the people’s 
court on 23 April 2012 and a six-month implementation period was set. As 
of today, its reorganisation plan has not been completed after six times of 
extension (six months for each extension). 127 As most reorganisation plans 
are passed without concrete operation schemes, their asset restructuring 
has proven to be difficult and prolonged. For instance, seven years since 
entering the reorganisation process, *ST Baoshuo and *ST Canghua 
have not finished their asset restructuring yet, which causes difficulties 
for their operations at present. Such companies have failed to make a 
profit and hence eliminate their risk of being delisted for many years. 
Some followed a two/three-year-loss and one-year-profit pattern.128 Such 
companies should be delisted, according to Some Opinions of the CSRC 
on Reforming, Improving and Strictly Executing the Delisting System 
of the Listed Companies (the CSRC’s Opinions on Delisting System).129 
They fall into the scope of companies which have been criticised by the 
CSRC as “companies listing suspending for a long time without being 
delisted”.130 Such companies have no going-concern ability but rather 
sustain on substantial government subsidies.131
On the other hand, it is ambiguous as to whether listed companies 
which have completed the implementation of their reorganisation plans 
and asset restructuring have gained going-concern ability to make a profit. 
For example, *ST Canghua, *ST Hualong and *ST Qinling were marked 
127 “西安宏盛科技发展股份有限公司关于重整计划执行和监督期限延长的公告 [Public An-
nounce ment on the Extension of the Term for the Implementation of the Reorganisation Plan 
of ST Hongsheng and of the Term for the Supervision over Its Implementation]”, available at 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/disclosure/sse/bulletin_detail/true/1200882625?announ
ceTime=2015-04-22 (visited 3 February 2016).
128 Companies such as *ST Shixian, *ST Zhaohua, *ST Canghua, *ST Hualong, *ST Qinling and 
S*ST Xingmei followed such a pattern. For more information, please visit the website of http://
www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/index (visited 20 October 2015).
129 “中国证券监督管理委员会关于改革完善并严格实施上市公司退市制度的若干意见 [Some 
Opinions of the CSRC on Reforming, Improving and Strictly Executing the Delisting System 
of the Listed Companies]”, the CSRC (15 October 2015), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/
pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201410/P020141017502705934937.pdf (visited 20 June 2015).
130 Ibid.
131 See Appendix A for more information.
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with delisting risks again as they suffered losses for two consecutive years 
after the completion of their reorganisation plans and asset restructuring. 
For the 27 successfully reorganised listed companies, more than 90% 
have received substantial government subsidies which help them to 
display profit in their balance sheet and hence returned to being listed or 
eliminated their risk of being delisted.132
(ii) Performance of listed companies after reorganisation
The author also intends to use the rate of returns on common 
shareholder—Return on Equity (ROE) as well as operating income as the 
auxiliary benchmarks to assess the result of the reorganisation. If the ROE 
of the year following the reorganisation is greater than 10% and is greater 
than 0 in the second year following the reorganisation, or the other way 
round, and at the same time, if the operating income is more than RMB 
10 million, then the result of the reorganisation is considered to be good. 
If the ROE of the first and second years following the reorganisation is less 
than 10% but greater than 0, then the result is considered to be acceptable. 
If the ROE in the first year after the reorganisation is less than 0, then 
the result is considered to be poor. In Table 2, among the 12 crammed-
down cases, there are two good results, five acceptable and five poor 
results. The results that are good or acceptable are regarded as successful, 
while the results that are poor are unsuccessful. Hence, the unsuccessful 
cases account for 41.7% of the crammed-down cases. The success rate 
is 58.3%, with good results accounting for 16.7% and acceptable results 
41.7%. In terms of those with poor results, if assessed with the assessing 
standards in Section 5(b)(i), *ST Dixian B and S*ST Guangming could 
be regarded as successful. However, the net assets of *ST Dixian B are 
negative for three consecutive years and its operating income was less than 
10 million for the following two years after its reorganisation. Under such 
circumstances it should be marked with *ST again.133 S*ST Guangming 
also has negative assets for two consecutive years, which makes the value 
of the ROE meaningless. The reorganisation results of *ST Guangxia, 
*ST Baoshuo and *ST Canghua are among the worst. They have not 
finished their asset restructuring, possess negative assets and operating 
income less than ten million for three consecutive years,134 which are very 
poor results after reorganisation. They fall into the unsuccessful group.
Compared with the results of the cramdown cases, the results of the 
reorganisation of non-cramdown cases are much better. Among the 
132 Ibid.
133 See r 14.1.1 of the Stock Listing Rules of SZSE.
134 See Appendix E of Factors for evaluating the effects of the reorganisation of the listed companies.
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45 cases, 33 listed companies did not go through cramdown. As the ROE 
data are not available for the year of 2015, the results of five cases, *ST 
Fenghuang, *ST Chaori, *ST Zhongda, *ST Xianchang and *ST Xiake, 
are not calculated. There are nine good results, eight acceptable and 
11 poor. The unsuccessful rate is 39.3% which is less than the 45.4% 
of the cramdown cases. The successful rate is 60.7%, with good results 
comprising 32.1%, much better than the 16.7% in the cramdown cases; 
and acceptable results being 28.6%,135 also higher than that of the 
cramdown cases.
The extensive and deep involvement of the government frustrates 
the merit of the reorganisation system in eliciting a timely rescue of the 
listed companies in China. In practice, none of the 45 listed companies 
are rescued in a timely manner. All were heavily in debt.136 If they were 
rescued in a timely manner, the repayment rate to their creditors would 
have been greatly increased, and the possibility of the success of the 
reorganisation and their performance would have been much higher. In 
practice, the average repayment rate to creditors is very low.
The UNCITRAL warns that “adopting a reorganisation-friendly 
approach should not result in establishing a safe haven for moribund 
enterprises: enterprises that are beyond rescue should be liquidated as 
quickly and efficiently as possible”.137 The reorganisation of the listed 
companies in China in fact is on the way of building such a safe haven for 
some listed companies that are near their demise, with no going-concern 
ability and sustaining on government subsidies. The government or 
debtor companies place the interests of the creditors instead of their own 
interests at risk to rescue these listed companies.138 This makes the decision 
to reorganise listed companies less prudent and inadequately assessed. As 
Dr Fang Yu pointed out, it is very likely that the reorganisation system is 
used as a tool for capital plunder; creditors pay the most for reorganisation 
costs in a transitional country like Russia where the market is immature.139 
China seems to follow the same pattern to protect capital owners at the 
expense of creditors due to a strong government standing in the way of 
more efficient allocation of market resource.
135 Ibid.
136 See Appendix A for General Information of Reorganisation of 45 Listed Companies.
137 See (n 21 above) pp 15–16.
138 任永青/Yongqing Ren (2003) “中国破产重整立法模式研究 [On the Legislative Pattern of the 
Bankruptcy Reorganisation in China]”, Tsinghua University, LLM Dissertation, p 29.
139 禹芳/Fang Yu (2010) “俄罗斯破产重整中债权人利益保护法律制度研究 [The Bankruptcy 
Legal System for the Protection of the Interests of Creditors in the Reorganisation in Russia]”, 
China University of Political Science and Law, PhD Dissertation, p 125.
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Table 2: Effects of the Reorganisation of the Listed Companies under 
Cramdown Procedure
Listed 
 company
Negative 
net prof-
its for 2 
con-
secutive 
years?
Nega-
tive net 
assets 
for 2 
con-
secutive 
years?
Operating 
income 
less than 
10 mil-
lion for 
2 con-
secutive 
years?
Debt 
re-
struc-
turing
Asset 
restruc-
turing
Revoca-
tion of 
delist-
ing risk 
warning ROE
S*ST Tianfa Noa Nob Noc Yesd Yese Yesf Acceptable
*ST Dixian B Nog Yesh Yesi Yesj Yesk Yesl Poor
S*ST 
Guangming
No m Yesn Noo Yesp Yesq Yesr Poor
*ST Jinhua Nos Not Nou Yesv Yesw Yesx Good
*ST Guangxia Yesy Yesz Yesaa Yesab No No Poor
*ST Fangxiang Noac Noad Noae Yesaf Yesag Yesah Good
*ST Jincheng Noai Noaj Noak Yesal No Yesam Acceptable
*ST Xinye Noan Noao Noap Yesaq No Yesar N/A
*ST Baoshuo Yesas Yesat Noau Yesav No Yesaw Poor
*ST Canghua Yesax Yesay Noaz Yesba No Yesbb Poor 
S*ST Tianyi Nobc Nobd Nobe Yesbf Yesbg Yesbh Acceptable
*ST 
Hongsheng
Nobi Nobj Nobk Nobl No Yesbm Acceptable
a See the annual reports of S*ST Tianfa in 2008, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage
/2009-04-23/51611865.PDF and in 2009, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2010-02-
05/57581200.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
b Ibid.
c Ibid.
d Available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2007-12-18/36050462.PDF (visited 18 August 
2015).
e “舜元地产发展股份有限公司董事会关于重组履行法定程序的完备性、合规性及提交的法
律文件的有效性说明 [Note of the Board of Director of Sunyoung Industry Development Co, Ltd 
on the Completeness and Compliance of the Fullfilment of Statutory Procedures Concerning the 
Restructuring and Effectiveness of the Legal Documents Submitted to the CSRC]”, available at http://
www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2012-09-28/61618124.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
f (2008-046) “天发石油股份有限公司关于深圳证券交易所同意受理公司恢复上市申请的公告 [An-
nouncement of S*ST Tianfa on the Approval by the SZSE of the Application for Relisting of the 
Company]”, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2008-05-13/39629791.PDF (visited 18 
August 2015).
g See the annual reports of S*ST Dixian B in 2009, English version available at http://www.cninfo.com.
cn/finalpage/2010-04-30/57897880.PDF and in 2010, English version available at http://www.cninfo.
com.cn/finalpage/2011-04-27/59346248.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
h Ibid.
i Ibid.
j It is available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2009-04-28/51875426.PDF (visited 18 August 
2015).
k (2013-056) “承德南江股份有限公司重大资产重组实施情况报告书 [Report of Chengde Nanjiang 
Co Ltd on the Implementation of Major Asset Restructuring]”, available at http://www.cninfo.com.
cn/finalpage/2013-07-05/62776392.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
l (2009-033) “承德帝贤针纺股份有限公司关于撤销股票退市风险警示并实行其他特别处理的公告 
[Announcement of *ST Dixian B on the Revocation of Its Delisting Risk Warning and the 
Implementation of Other Special Treatment]”, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/
2009-07-06/54267814.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
(Continued)
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m See the annual reports of S*ST Guangming in 2010, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2011-04-02/59220760.PDF and in 2011, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2012-04-27/60920733.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
n See the annual reports of S*ST Guangming in 2009, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2010-04-27/57876047.PDF and in 2010, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2011-04-02/59220760.PDF (visited 18 August 2015).
o See works referred to in note 183.
p (2011-005) “光明集团家具股份有限公司关于公司《重整计划》执行完毕的公告 [Announce ment 
of S*ST Guangming on the Consummation of the Reorganisation Plan]”, available at http://www.
cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2011-03-10/59101153.PDF (visited 19 August 2015).
q (2011-76) “光明集团家具股份有限公司关于完成工商变更登记的公告 [Announcement of S*ST 
Guangming on the Completion of the Change of Business Registration]”, available at http://www.
cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2011-12-16/60330343.PDF (visited 19 August 2015).
r (2011-046) “光明集团家具股份有限公司关于撤销股票退市风险警示的公告 [Announce ment of 
S*ST Guangming on the Revocation of Its Delisting Risk Warning]”, available at http://www.cninfo.
com.cn/finalpage/2011-10-27/60120256.PDF?COLLCC=445382692& (visited 19 August 2015).
s See the annual reports of *ST Jinhua in 2011, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2012-02-18/60556810.PDF and in 2012, available at http://www.cninfo.com.cn/
finalpage/2013-03-21/62236540.PDF (visited 19 August 2015).
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6. Conclusion
In this article, the influence from the government on the bankruptcy 
institutions including the administrator mechanism, the creditors’ 
meeting and committee and the people’s court has been discussed in 
detail. The 2006 EBL does establish a new administrator mechanism, 
strengthen the power of creditors’ meeting and committee and entrust 
the cramdown power with the people’s court to confirm reorganisation 
plans rejected by creditors. However, in practice, the liquidation group 
has become the dominant type of administrator in the reorganisation 
of listed companies. It lacks independence and impartiality. The 
liquidation-group administrator is inclined to protect the interests of big 
shareholders, especially SOEs or SASACs, at the cost of general creditors. 
The creditors’ meeting and committee also lack power. They fail to 
supervise and balance the power of the liquidation-group administrator 
due to strong administrative pressure from local governments, who aim 
to maintain the listing status of the listed companies, protecting state-
owned assets and local interests. Regarding the power and independence 
of the people’s court, it cannot make independent rulings in cramming 
down reorganisation plans rejected by creditors. The differences between 
the reorganisation procedure in the books and in practice, to a great 
extent, come from the extensive government intervention in the 
reorganisation of listed companies, which is supported by the empirical 
evidence of the reorganisation of the 45 listed companies entering into 
reorganisation. Under such circumstances, the bankruptcy institutions 
cannot function well as expected by the lawmakers of the 2006 EBL. Old 
practices do die hard and there is pushback by both the people’s court and 
the local governments as discussed in this article. It leads to the result 
that government intervention has remained quite strong under the new 
2006 EBL.
It is admitted that there may be some problems with these institutions 
themselves, such as social intermediaries that may lack experience in 
reorganisation work and be incapable to coordinate different government 
departments to facilitate the reorganisation work of listed companies; the 
law itself may be ambiguous and prone to errors. However, these problems 
cannot be employed as excuses for the government to intervene in the 
reorganisation of listed companies. At present, government intervention 
constitutes the greatest impediment to the smooth implementation of the 
reorganisation system in accordance with the 2006 EBL.
The government intends to realise its own goals in the reorganisation 
process, such as maintaining the listing status of listed companies, 
protecting state-owned assets and safeguarding various local interests, 
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which do not concord with the reorganisation goals provided in the 
2006 EBL: to protect the going-concern value of the listed companies 
and community interests. Government intervention does not result 
in efficient results, such as many listed companies do not gain going-
concern ability after reorganisation. A substantial proportion of their 
profits come from government subsidies. Some companies have not 
finished their asset restructuring after many rounds. The listing or stock 
trading of such companies has been suspended for a long time, unduly 
wasting market resources. They have developed a vicious two/three-year-
loss and subsequent-year-gain cycle. Such companies should be delisted 
from the stock market according to the CSRC’s Opinions on Delisting 
System. However, only one bankrupt listed company, *ST Chuangzhi, 
has been delisted among the 45 listed companies as of date. The blind 
and arbitrary rescue of the government of listed companies also frustrates 
China’s delisting system.
With the development of relevant institutions—as the capacity and 
quality of the judiciary, social intermediary such as legal practitioners 
and accountants and the creditors’ meeting and committee improve—
it is possible that a somewhat more independent process will develop. 
However, concerning that China is constructing a socialist market 
economy which persists in the dominant position of the SOEs and a policy 
of strong state intervention, it is more likely that the government will 
remain involved—and certainly in the most significant cases. Currently 
in the bankruptcy practice, a different model of corporate liquidation and 
reorganisation is emerging in China with a strong government presence.
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